Transport policy in developed countries has for a long time included the need to increase the usage of public transport. The availability of 'good' public transport is a major strand in policies to achieve greater usage of public transport and to influence modal shift. However, 'good' public transport has many attributes including financial sustainability and the provision of quality services efficiently.
INTRODUCTION
Transport policy in developed countries has for a long time included the need to increase the usage of public transport. The identified motivation for this has changed over the years -from a desire to reduce the need to control the number of cars as shown, in the UK, by the seminal works of Buchannan and Plowden 1 to environmental reasons and the specific reduction of congestion as shown again, in the UK, by the 10 year plan * published by the Department of Transport 2 . The availability of 'good' public transport is a major strand in policies to achieve greater usage of public transport and to influence modal shift. However, 'good' public transport has many attributes including financial sustainability and the provision of quality services efficiently. This paper addresses two related themes relevant to the provision of 'good' public transport with particular reference to the provision of urban bus services in the UK.
The first theme examines the way in which financial stability, quality and efficiency can be measured by urban transport providers: in this context the paper considers the theoretical and practical issues of applying benchmarking by an urban transport provider. The second theme considers the economic framework in which differences in behaviour of public and private firms and differences in legislative frameworks can be a means of explaining the disparity in attitude by transport providers to the potential benefits of the benchmarking tool. This is important because understanding what is best quality performance and attempting to move towards industry best is one of the most secure ways of ensuring the provision of quality services in a financially stable environment.
MEASURING QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT
There is a plethora of management models and ideas which can be used in a business context to improve business performance 3 . Benchmarking has been a key tool in the business improvement armoury for many years 4 .
Benchmarking is a way of measuring how good the business is at what it does, making a quantitative statement as to whether their performance is as good as other businesses and using this information to improve the business process. In short, benchmarking is a tool for searching for industry best practice, leading to improvement in performance. It is an on-going technique for measuring and improving processes against the best that can be identified. It requires data gathering, goal setting and analysis. Benchmarking is concerned with facts in contrast to other key management tools, such as balanced scorecards, which also include more subjective elements relating to business aspirations. Benchmarking can be widely applied and can cover all aspects of measurable activity: in a urban bus context, benchmarking could cover both inputs (internal efficiency) and outputs (revenue and passenger responses).
After participating in benchmarking, the organisation will have gained an in-depth knowledge of itself. The measurement process provided by benchmarking provides a baseline data set for improvements and for target setting on a basis which can be understood throughout the organisation. The areas for potential improvement are identified, target values (perhaps with intermediate milestones) can be set and there will be an estimate of the value gain for the organisation. The team building achieved in the benchmarking activity will provide the platform for the action teams which achieve the improvements. Benchmarking is a key step in a continuous improvement process although it will not add value in itself -it is the catalyst to change. Value is only added through achieving real improvements. Figure 1 shows the generic methodology of the benchmarking process. Benchmarking in general is a cyclical process in which one complete cycle of benchmarking involves nine stages. In the context of a public transport operator, the process would commence with the definition and agreement of the factors which are critical to the success of an individual company (stage 1). This is followed by the development of appropriate performance measures, known as indicators (stage 2). These indicators are then measured by individual operators (stage 3). Benchmarking enables an operator to compare indicators with other operators (stage 4), so that areas of relative strength and weakness can be determined (stage 5). Having reviewed all relevant business processes, individual operators can decide the operational aspects which would be commercially valuable to improve (stage 6). An operator will work with at least one other partner who has been identified as being best in the selected areas of operation (stage 7). The operator is then able to plan and implement improvements to the business (stage 8). Benchmarking in general is a permanent, on-going process: having implemented improvements, the indicators need to be monitored (stage 9). Furthermore, since the business is not static, the operator will need to review all indicators periodically, which will require starting once again with a review of the critical success factors for the business (stage 1). In practice, operators do not need to complete the full cycle (although this would bring most benefits) and could carry out internal benchmarking (finishing at stage 3) or compare figures with an anonymous database (finishing at stage 6).
The critical aspect of learning from best practice in a benchmarking context is that this should be undertaken within a framework in which participants are not competing for the same business. In practice, much learning from best practice will come from intra-industry comparison but there are processes or activities where inter-industry comparison is not only valid but desirable 6 . 
BENCHMARKING IN THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SECTOR
One of the earliest interests in performance measurement was noted in the passenger transport sector over twenty years ago with the investigation by the OECD. The OECD Road Research Programme undertook an examination of the key issues to be considered in developing a technically sound approach to evaluation of performance, using various 'packages' of indicators. The resulting report outlines a clear conceptual basis for development of system-wide indicators in two categories of interest to this paper: efficiency and effectiveness 7 . Effectiveness is concerned with the results of the service, while efficiency is concerned with the means of achieving these results.
The report identifies eight groups of users with each having differing needs for performance indicators: public transport managers; municipal managers; policy makers; regional planners; street traffic system managers; central, national and state governments; public transport users; and the research community. Data requirements and sources are identified and the pros and cons of manual versus automatic data collection systems described. The recommended set of performance indicators required for the purposes of (a) service planning, (b) internal assessment, (c) comparison of different operations and (d) more global assessment are outlined. In addition, some applications for each indicator are noted, together with advice of the frequency at which the measure should be reported. However, despite this early work, no evidence of it being put into practice in a sustained way has been identified in the public transport sector. This is possibly due to the way that the report highlighted the difficulties of measuring indicators in a consistent way and suggested, as a solution, that the measurement should therefore be used within a firm over a period of time rather than as an inter-firm comparison, i.e. stopping at stage 3 in the cyclical process ( Figure 1 ).
Since this report, there have been a number of initiatives spearheaded by the European Commission (EC) framework research programme. The ISOTOPE (Improved Structure and Organisation for Transport Operations of Passengers in Europe) project (1995) (1996) (1997) developed a set of key performance indicators for different types of public transport operators and a number of cities within the context of identifying the most effective and efficient organisational structures for urban public transport. This was followed by the QUATTRO (Quality approach in tendering urban public transport operations) project (1996) (1997) (1998) . This project was designed to aid public authorities define and monitor quality in the provision of tendering and contracting work and recommended benchmarking as the process for quality enhancement measurement. In addition, QUATTRO worked with the experts from the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN). In March 1999 CEN issued draft recommendations for the definition, targeting and measurement of service quality (TC 320 WG 5). The standard itself is not intended to be compulsory or to set targets -the purpose of the CEN recommendations is to standardise indicators and terminology to promote a quality approach to public transport operations and focus interest on customers' needs and expectations. The CEN standard publication is now live and is incorporated into national standards where appropriate 8 .
Despite this background of interest and promotion, there has been little performance measurement in the public transport sector. For road passenger transport, one of the first European initiatives towards benchmarking in public transport was the project for developing and realising competitive transportation services (KiPa) in Finland. The project was led by Bussialan Kehittämispalvelut Oy, a development company owned by the Finnish Bus and Coach Association. This initiative was applied first to inter-urban bus services as an extension of work based on the road haulage sector and subsequently to a number of more local bus operators by TransControl, a company who developed and extended the KiPa work for this purpose. The TransControl benchmarking methodology is a process whereby a public transport company is evaluated by an external expert using a comprehensive set of indicators that measure the quality of the operator's performance. However, it relies heavily on the firm not only wanting to carry out benchmarking but also having the financial resources to employ the experts to do it.
It is against this background that the most important project for this paper, the EC EQUIP project, is set. EQUIP was concerned with the benchmarking of efficiency in all modes of local public transport. Specifically, EQUIP dealt with the "internal" efficiency of the public transport operator -in other words, the capability to achieve planned outputs within performance targets, and the optimisation of the use of resources to achieve this. "Quality" of service and customer satisfaction were considered as "external factors" and were only considered within EQUIP where they had internal relevance. This was not to say that these factors were somehow less important -it was simply that the external factors were well considered in other work as shown above, whereas EQUIP focused on the operator. Unlike any previous study, EQUIP was concerned to produce a self assessment handbook so that operators could carry out the measurement themselves and not need to rely on bringing in external experts.
The major, and most tangible, output of EQUIP is the Handbook which was developed through an iterative process with deep participation by the industry sector. An extensive search 9 was carried out to identify relevant indicators which were then refined and clustered, and supported by a comprehensive measurement methodology. The first version of the Handbook was developed and used by the EQUIP Network of operators for self-assessment. This provided validation and feedback to produce the final version for public release which has been approved by the European Commission. This is discussed in more detail after the next section which provides the theoretical framework for this paper.
THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Two issues are considered in this section. First, a synopsis is provided of the economic theory -principally derived from principal agent theory -which gives predictions about the way in which ownership drives management and workers. The intention is to explore how this theory can give a potential insight into the way in which management information and the benefits of performance management, using a tool such as benchmarking could be viewed by companies with different ownership structure. Second, this section examines the question as to whether the type of regulation under which the public transport operates has an impact on their desire to conduct performance management techniques such as benchmarking. The theory is exemplified by a transportparticularly road transport -context as this is the focus of this paper.
Principle-agent problems
The principle agent problem is concerned with asymmetries of information between two parties who are in an established contractual agreement. This could, for example, be the bilateral relationship between the owner of the firm (principal) and the manager (agent) where asymmetries of information occur because the agent has specific and more detailed knowledge than the principal about the opportunities available to the firm and the principal will only partially be able to observe the effort the agent or manager puts into the job. An understanding of the way in which these information asymmetries arise can lead to the parties trying to design contracts that mitigate the difficulties that these principal-agent problems bring and this has been the basis of the growing literature on Organisational Architecture for firms 10 .
In practice there are two types of information problem that can occur in these situations. The first is the type of problem that occurs from hidden actions, sometimes known as moral hazard when, for example, the owner cannot observe how hard his manager works. The second is the type of problem which arises from hidden information, as illustrated by the way in which the agent may have more detailed knowledge about available opportunities for the firm than the principal. Whilst most situations will involve some degree of both information asymmetries, it is worth distinguishing them here to identify their separate impacts.
For firms, the amount workers produce will be a function of a range of factors -some factors relating to efficiency and some relating to effort or enthusiasm. If an owner observes a particular productivity, how can it be determined whether greater enthusiasm on behalf of the managers would improve productivity or not? The basis of this problem is that because an owner cannot observe fully the effort and efficiency of its management, the management has an incentive and the scope to pursue their own objectives rather than those of the owner. Of course, if full information was available, there would be no such scope. This paper is particularly concerned with information asymmetries which arise when an owner (principal) employs a manager (agent) who subsequently knows more about the opportunities available to the firm than the owner) as these are pertinent to the behaviour of the agent * .
The next stage is to consider what differences might occur if the public transport operator is in private or public ownership? These are considered in turn.
Private Ownership
Private ownership can take one of two forms -a firm could be owned by a single owner, as with many small public transport operators in the private sector or it could be a company which has many shareholders, such as Stagecoach Group or Go-Ahead Group in the UK ** . This is important because principal-agent theory suggests that some sort of monitoring by the principal will be required if the agent is to be persuaded to behave in the principal's best interests by maximising their return. Monitoring by principals is usually undertaken by the design of an incentive scheme that meets their needs whilst recognising that agents, given the incentive scheme, will behave in a self interested way. The monitoring cannot be too restrictive because to work it must be sufficiently attractive for agents to want to undertake the venture with the principal. Clearly, if there are many shareholders rather than one owner, this monitoring task is more difficult and perhaps less efficient, especially if different shareholders have different objectives.
Another aspect of the difference between single or many owners (as in shareholders) is that, in the latter case, there is a well defined procedure for takeover. Because shares are marketable, the size distribution of shareholdings can change quickly as a result of shareholder buying and selling decisions. This means that it is possible for a single shareholder to seek to buy all the shares by making a takeover bid which, if successful, would concentrate ownership and eliminate the externalities associated with having many owners. The perceived threat of takeovers is regarded as one of the incentives for agents not to deviate too far from the principal's interests since the single owner can much more effectively monitor and this would be associated with loss of control for the agent. However, the empirical evidence, at least for the UK, is not unambiguous about the strength of the takeover threat in making agents behave. This is attributed, perhaps most importantly, to the way in which shareholders per se do not have much influence over acquisition decisions and so again the agents have the upper hand to try and align their own interests at the expense of the principal's.
A variation on the takeover constraint is the threat of bankruptcy. The argument here is that agents would lose the (ultimate) managerial control of the firm if it were to become bankrupt. Clearly there are stark differences to both principals and agents between takeovers and bankruptcy although the economic analysis is somewhat similar. There is an extensive literature on this subject, both theoretical and empirical. In the UK, it was provoked and illustrated by the embracing nature of the UK privatisation programme 11 .
Public Ownership
Public ownership, like private ownership, can take several forms. However, all forms of public ownership have a common element -that of effective single ownership * . Given the preceding section, it might be thought that this would make the analysis easier. Unfortunately, whilst single ownership is a simplifying aspect, public ownership is complicated by additional principal-agent relationships which are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Typically there are two different types of public officials involved in monitoring as principals: the elected officials appropriate to ownership (whether this be at national or local level) and the public servant or bureaucrat (civil servant or local government officer). The agents are the managers of the publicly owned company. It should not be forgotten that both the managers and the employees of the public company are also likely to be 'owners' in the sense of being members of the general public and this is a further complication.
The relationship between the electorate and the politician has a key influence: politicians develop 'egotistical', short-term objectives in the form of a desire for re-election. This leads to their favouring special interest groups against less vocal stakeholders ** and against potentially superior long-term objectives. Traditionally, it was believed that the threat of re-election would be * This is an oversimplification. In practice, a wide range of stakeholders 'own' public companies. However, there is a distinct difference between the general public's ownership of a public company and the shareholder's ownership of a private company: this is reflected in the relationship between the principal and the agent. In the former case, the stakeholders devolve the principal role to the elected representatives whereas in the latter case, shareholders can have a much more direct influence on agents.
**A stakeholder on any issue represents different individuals, organized groups, or informal, interested parties that the expert source or sources believe have in interest in determining or preferences regarding the outcome of the any specific policy question.
enough to ensure that politicians acted in the best interests of the stakeholders but this does depend on voters being well informed, not only about the decisions made by politicians on their behalf but also on the outcome of these decisions. In practice this is another source of information asymmetry as voters express their views over a whole range of issues, not just the management of a single public company. This means the incentive (by voters) to acquire the information on which to judge their elected representatives in relation to this single company is not strong. This is compounded by the way in which managers and workers in the public company will be voters and so there are asymmetries of information within the population of voters * .
For the public company, their second principal is the civil servant or local government official as it is likely that the bureaucrat will be concerned with the detail of the monitoring. The post of bureaucrat does not suffer from the lack of tenure inherent in the role of an elected politician and this is therefore less likely to explain their behaviour towards monitoring. Research suggests that it is the size of budget and economic rent which accrues to the bureaucrat which has more influence 12 . The activities of the bureaucrats will be overseen by their political masters: if budget is the only factor, theory suggests that the outcome can be very detrimental with significantly increased unit costs. This suggests more direct monitoring of bureaucratic activity is also required. However, from the politician's point of view this is unlikely to improve their own standpoint: bureaucrats normally have better information about the public company than their political masters and the factors which make bureaucrats feel better (size of budget, size of department) are likely, other things being equal, to enhance the welfare of the politician. This is perhaps also the reason why bureaucrats prefer direct interference in public company management rather than the 'arm's length' guidance that was a feature of many companies when first brought into the public sector 13 .
Overlaying all these relationships are the complexities of the stakeholder map of a typical publicly owned transport (or, more generally, service based) company. This is alluded to in the opening paragraph of this section and partially illustrated by some of the agent-principal relationships already discussed. Stakeholder maps may well take different forms in different countries and/ or different institutional environments. Typically the highest Management Board of the company will have representatives of stakeholder groups (including elected representatives where appropriate) in addition to managers. This immediately increases the numbers of principals for whom a separate principal-agent relationship will exist with the company and thus inevitably leads to a more complex principal-agent structure for public companies as compared with private companies. A consequence is that the definition of good performance will be more multi-dimensional in this context to reflect the different objectives of the stakeholder groups.
Institutional and regulatory framework
It is widely accepted that governments have policy options which involve a trade off between efficiency criteria and equity criteria in evaluating changes which affect the performance of sectors of the economy or the whole economy. From a regulatory point of view, there appear to be no robust reason for having a system of quantity regulation for much of public transport operations (the exception being the provision of rail infrastructure where for many reasons, a single operator may be necessary) 14 . Competition in the market is sufficient to generate allocative efficiency 15 . This discussion does not relate to safety regulation which is clearly necessary * .
The market for public transport services has moved from being largely regulated at the beginning of the 1980s to being largely deregulated in the 21 st century. In the UK, road public transport is unregulated (outside London) 16 . Operators can register all services for operation without subsidy. Services which are not provided commercially and which are deemed necessary are provided by tender where operators compete for the right to supply services (sometimes called off the road competition) at a (usually) fixed price. At the other extreme, public transport operations can benefit from a 'block' form of subsidy whereby the 'profitability' of each route within a network is not considered separately but the subsidy merely meets the gap between revenues and costs. In between are the franchise systems where there is (off-road) competition to run a collection of services which may be profitable with no subsidy or the bidding may be of the form of the minimum subsidy to provide a specified level of service in a spatial area.
Implications for performance measurement
This section draws out the implications of the previous theory for performance measurement and relates * Indeed, it is not difficult to show that the payoffs to workers of a public company (in terms of wages or compensation for changes that might bring about efficiency gains) will be a factor that affects the well-being of elected representatives (in terms of their likelihood of being re-elected).
* The identification of the correct level of safety regulation is outside the scope of this paper.
this to ownership and institutional structures. The first part relates to what is measured and the second to the propensity for public transport companies to become involved with measurement. The principal-agent framework suggests, in terms of benchmarking, that it is important to take account of the nature of ownership when comparing with peers as ownership can have a significant impact on the importance of a particular indicator to a company. Indeed, the theory also suggests that the indicators used to measure efficient performance may vary depending on whether the firm to be measured is in the private or public sector.
For private firms, concentration on output measures (in particular those measures which look at the translation of inputs into outputs) is likely to be most satisfactory as private sector firms will be driven by the profit motive in some guise. For firms in the public sector, these may not be agreed as suitable because of the greater complexity of the principal-agent relationships. Indeed, it may be difficult to agree a set of measures that all stakeholders agree as important and a more widely based set of indicators might be expected as an outcome.
Whilst the section on institutional framework above is brief, it is sufficient to highlight the way in which different public transport operators have the incentive to measure their performance. Whether in public or private ownership, a company which lives in a world where the public purse funds the gap between revenues and costs without question, has no incentive to improve. At the other extreme, a company which has no subsidy for commercially operated routes and for whom subsidy has to be bid for, has every incentive to measure and improve their performance. If a private sector company is in this position then improvement leads to higher profits or an ability to attract more subsidies through contract bidding. It is less clear to see what a public company might gain from measuring performance on this simplistic level although the empirical evidence is that public companies often embark on performance measurement as a means of justifying either their public status or their regulatory framework.
THE 'EMPIRICAL' EVIDENCE: THE EQUIP PROJECT AND SUBSEQUENT EXPERIENCES
This section draws on the experience of the EQUIP project together with more recent experience with benchmarking bus operators in the UK to provide some empirical evidence for the theory discussed in the previous section.
The EQUIP Handbook
The final EQUIP Handbook is composed of two parts. Part I contains the Method, which covers the background to benchmarking and the motivation for carrying it out. Part II is divided into two sections: the list of indicators in a format that is ready to be completed by the users and accompanied by a separate Guide to Completion * . For this paper, the most interesting aspects are the indicators and the lessons learnt from the project. As discussed above, the Handbook was validated by a crossEuropean Network of operators ** .
The EQUIP Handbook was designed to cover all modes of public transport operator and contains 91 indicators collated into eleven clusters as shown by Table 1 below *** .
The literature research together with the interaction with the EQUIP Network identified the problem that many definitions are affected by cultural and institutional or operating contexts. This meant that the EQUIP Handbook needed to define specific system definitions for the purposes of the EQUIP indicators which formed an integral part of the Handbook.
Company Profile indicators (Cluster 1) provide the background for selecting operators with which to benchmark as they describe how a company is organised and the level of penetration within its operating area. The External Influences on the Operator (Cluster 2) form a key set of indicators for determining benchmarking partnerships. The influence of the outside world in which the operator provides its service is significant for the performance of the operator and thus has implications if benchmarking is on an international level and the operators come from different market environments with varying degrees of regulation and subsidy.
Cluster 3, Revenue and Fare Structure, refers to the indicators that define the fare structure of the operator. The utilisation of vehicles and manpower is the key to the fiscal performance of a public transport operator (Cluster 4, Asset/Capacity Utilisation). The most important indicators are those that consider how full the vehicles are, the * Part I of the Handbook supports companies carrying out benchmarking.
It provides a reference document for the co-ordinator and it is not essential reading for all those involved in data collection at a company. The Guide is designed to be referred to whilst completing the indicators. time it takes for passengers to board the vehicle, the utilisation of the fleet and the drivers, and the distance travelled by vehicles that do not produce any revenue.
Even if an operator utilises its assets well, its performance may be impeded by poor reliability in terms of non-adherence to published schedules (Cluster 5). For example, services may be delayed or abandoned at the origin or during the journey or the operator may have difficulty in maintaining the planned headway. Production Cost indicators (Cluster 6) measure how efficiently the operator is able to provide the service with the available resources and Company Performance indicators (Cluster 7) chosen to give a broad overview as well as trends over five years for indicators relating to patronage, the overall operating profit or loss, operating performance, net profit margin and interest cover. Cluster 8 looks at technical performance in two ways: by measuring indicators that directly affect on the road performance, e.g. fuel consumption, emissions, vehicle breakdown and failure and second, by monitoring the on-going maintenance programme.
Most of the Employee Satisfaction measures (Cluster 9) can be evaluated by the operator, using information in the company records. In contrast, the best and almost the only way to get relevant information about Customer Satisfaction (Cluster 10) is to make a survey of the current public transport passengers. Survey results can be compared with the image that the operator has of its performance simply by asking the operator to complete the same questionnaires as the customers. In addition to customer opinions, hard measure indicators are also relevant for the benchmarking exercise, e.g. the number of complaints and accessibility to vehicles in terms of, for example, the % of vehicles with wheelchair access. The Safety and Security (Cluster 11) covers the actual traffic safety of the operator and the safety of the working environment. It shows the number of incidents on the road, together with the number of injuries sustained by drivers and passengers.
A subset of 27 'super' indicators were chosen in order to help operators with limited resources to begin benchmarking -they are the 'entry level' set of indicators and a response to the demand for a set of indicators which would require a lower resource to complete. These are shown in Table 2 above. These indicators were selected because they are important to operators for benchmarking their performance, they allow operators to select suitable benchmarking partners and because they have been found to be important in a survey of nine other reports of benchmarking performance.
Results of the EQUIP project
EQUIP aimed to raise benchmarking awareness through its activities and to create a network of local transport operators and local authorities as a forum for meeting key transport actors and to ensure that the work in EQUIP was relevant to potential users. The EQUIP Network was developed spanning the six European countries of the EQUIP partnership, as well as other EC countries and Eastern Europe once the final EQUIP Handbook had been prepared. The first version of the Handbook was developed and used by the EQUIP Network of operators for self-assessment. The EQUIP Network thus offered the opportunity to focus on a series of comparison procedures amongst operators in order to identify the most suitable indicators for measurement, both in terms of measuring performance and suitable areas for improvement.
All data provision aspects of the EQUIP Network were made under the umbrella of a very strong confidentiality agreement which bound the research team, coordinated by the University of Newcastle, to complete confidence in relation to the data. As a result, it is not possible to give detailed results of commercially sensitive data in numerical terms. Moreover, operators taking part helped the development of the EQUIP Handbook by piloting the draft Handbook: the final Handbook took account of any difficulties which became evident at the pilot stage. However, to give some flavour to the type of operator involved, the Network included both small companies (30 vehicles) and large companies (over 1,100 vehicles) operating in both deregulated and regulated markets in which the operators varied from having a minority to 100% of the market share in their operating area. Operator responsibilities varied from being solely responsible for providing services to being responsible for timetable development and infrastructure provision and these different operating environments meant that fare levels and aspirations for the fare-box contribution to revenue was diverse. This was also demonstrated in fairly wide variation in peak fleet utilisation with the deregulated companies demonstrating consistently higher peak usage. Similarly there was high variation in the figures submitted for non-revenue earning distance travelled by vehicles in the fleet: the privately owned companies in the deregulated environment displayed the lowest figures. Perhaps most surprisingly was the very high variation in vehicle maintenance which could only partly be explained by differences in the age profile of fleets. The qualitative and quantitative responses to the completion of the Handbook by members of the EQUIP Network reinforced the conclusions identified below: a nationally focussed Handbook, thus standardising for operating environment, with a third party to help collect, collate and undertake quality control of the data, is a pre-requisite for good benchmarking in local public transport. These aspects have been carried forward in the UK based benchmarking discussed in the next section.
Overall, the experiences of the Network highlighted four important issues which are relevant to the development of benchmarking in local public transport. First, whilst operators in each country were overtly interested in participating in benchmarking activities, many clearly felt isolated at the start of a new exercise: this emerged during the National Workshops organised by EQUIP.
More seriously, the greatest problem facing operators in the EQUIP Network was the lack of resourcetime and manpower -to prioritise the establishment of the necessary systems to collect and record data for the Handbook. But perhaps the most serious disadvantage of self-assessment is data quality control. Despite careful detail in the definitions, it was unclear how many of the operators actually read them: comparison of data showed clear simple errors (for example, using national currency rather than the standard euro). This suggests that there should be a third party who should check and collate data for the set of companies who are benchmarking to ensure true comparison of like with like.
Throughout Europe there has been a trend towards greater privatisation and more competition for public transport services. This is reflected by rapid changes in the character of companies. Such activities were seen obstacles to benchmarking, e.g. company accounts and other data are often reorganised, making it difficult to access relevant data and to make internal comparisons over a period of time. However, reorganisation could be regarded as an opportunity to introduce new systems such as those required for benchmarking. Whilst many of the indicators which depend on monetary units were thought to be difficult to compare at the European level where different operational and economical environments exist, there were many indicators which are well suited to just such trans-national comparison, for example the asset/capacity utilisation indicators. This is, of course, a very important issue for international benchmarking but one which evidence suggests that the many difficulties are perceived rather than actual 17 .
In the context of this paper, it is worth noting that none of the 'big' UK private bus companies joined the EQUIP Network: they participate in in-house benchmarking suggesting that private firms do have a greater incentive to monitor performance. Outside the UK, all EQUIP Network members were public sector owned: the complexities of the stakeholder map may well explain the difficulties of achieving agreement on which indicators were particularly important and the lack of incentive to produce the appropriate management information to complete the Handbook. The UK Network included one small private operator whose ability to complete the Handbook was frustrated by lack of time resource but who commented on the potential usefulness of the process.
More recent experience
Following EQUIP, a group of 15 UK bus operators, all having similar characteristics, agreed to join to form a bus benchmarking group. This has pioneered bus benchmarking in the UK outside the big bus groups. The work with this group has been designed to overcome the problems identified by the EQUIP project.
All these companies operate in the same UK institutional framework, in the private sector and share similar evolutionary backgrounds as former publicly owned companies (as described in Section 4.2 above). The Transport Operations Research Group of the University of Newcastle acted as the third party in facilitating the process and holding the company data in confidence and reporting -following the model of Imperial College in its role as mentor for the Metro benchmarking. Initially, the companies had diverse expectations from the benchmarking process perhaps illustrating the effects of their former background in the public sector: for some it was a defensive move to demonstrate good performance to their shareholders whereas for others it was to identify the better elements of their peers and to learn from best practice.
The process began by choosing and modifying appropriate indicators from the EQUIP Handbook as it was found that many of the indicator definitions were compromised by the European setting of the Handbook. A pilot first year was undertaken which highlighted the difficulties for some companies of providing comparable information but also identified areas where there was potential for a more in-depth focussing of attention.
Following the first year of benchmarking, this group is continuing to benchmark but is also beginning the improvement cycle by undertaking a more in-depth study. The first area of close scrutiny has been the engineering part of the business, with 10 key indicators being derived to focus methodically on vehicle and maintenance performance as shown in Table 3 below:  Table 3 indicates the depth of the indicators being discussed in this context: the desire to concentrate on these output related measures is consistent with what the principal-agent theory discussed above would predict for companies in the private sector, as is the next planned area of detailed enquiry -that of productivity.
Whilst this study is still at an early stage, the initial results from each of the companies, held in confidence by the research team, suggest that there are dramatic differences in particular attributes between makes of ve- Days off road for This KPI records days off road due to mechanical failure reflecting a number of potential causes non-planned maintenance including the effectiveness of planned maintenance (as a preventative measure), the reliability of the vehicle category and the quality of manufacturer support (availability of parts and other support).
Abandoned service journeys This KPI is records the percentage of scheduled mileage not operated, broken down by reason.
Repeat defects This KPI identifies how often faults are not rectified on the first occasion. This may giver rise to information on persistent problems which may be specific to a vehicle type or to a maintenance process.
Peak Vehicle Requirement
This shows PVR and engineering spares in relation to the overall fleet, broken down by vehicle (PVR) by vehicle type type.
Fuel consumption This KPI looks at fuel usage (kilometre per litre) both by fleet type and vehicle category.
Material cost This KPI indicates the material cost associated with vehicle categories.
Maintenance staff This KPI shows at a point in time the number of maintenance staff employed to maintain buses relative to the fleet size and PVR.
Maintenance costs This KPI looks at the maintenance costs (not including running costs) per kilometre of operation.
Age profile This information will also be used in association with other indicators, since some engineering costs may be age as well as vehicle related.
PCV pass rate This KPI will record the success rate at MOT.
hicles. In addition there are differences in reliability which can be quantified by the resources devoted to maintenance. This benchmarking group is beginning to benefits of the cross pollination of best practice ideas following this in-depth study and comparison between the companies.
CONCLUSIONS
Performance measurement as a pre-requisite to performance enhancement has been demonstrated in many industries. In essence, there is no demonstrable gains in performance unless it is known where the starting point is.
Benchmarking is particularly appropriate as a tool as it is engenders an expectation of continuous improvement. However, with the notable exception of the metro benchmarking and the internal benchmarking of the big UK privatised bus companies and their subsidiaries, very little serious benchmarking has been carried out in the public transport sector.
The economic theory briefly considered in this paper offers an explanation for the relative paucity of activity in this area. The theory identifies that the complexities of the stakeholder map make it more difficult for public sector companies to identify a narrow set of key indicators which affect performance as compared to private companies who will normally have profit as an over-arching objective.
The theory also identifies the way in which the institutional framework will have an impact on the motivation for performance measurement. Apart from EQUIP Network which lasted for the duration of the EQUIP project, the UK bus benchmarking group is the first of its kind (in much the same way as the metro benchmarking groups are also pioneers) and its emergence and continuation has learnt from the lessons of EQUIP.
As a concluding note, whilst the EQUIP project recognised the barriers to international benchmarking created by differences in institutional environments, the economic theory suggests that EQUIP might have been more successful if it had recognised the different information asymmetries embedded in different ownership structures of public transport and designed indicators more suited to their separate needs. Perhaps more importantly, future attempts at encouraging performance measurement in the public transport sector should embrace this information.
